Recently, Iran has gained prominence, not because of its nuclear program, but because of the wave of peaceful protests following the unjustified death of Mahsa Amini. These protests call for a change in the political structure in Iran.
The cruel and unjustified Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to dominate the pages, news and analysis in think tanks, press and social media. However, on September 16, 2022, the death of Mahsa Amini would turn the eyes and the spotlight on Iran.
In this article, it will be explained why the cruel death of this young woman has been a fuse of major internal discontent in Iran, at a critical time for the Islamic Republic. These peaceful protests are demanding for the first time a change of political model in Iran, why these protests have erupted just now, what is the difference of these protests from the previous ones?
To understand why these protests are taking place, two clarifications about Iran must be made. Iran is the most ethnically heterogeneous country in the Middle East and 85% of its population professes Shia Islam, but there is also a minority of almost 10% professing Sunni Islam, and Christian, Zoroastrian and Jewish minorities that together would amount to 4% of the population. However, the Iranian population is increasingly secular and young. Sixty percent of Iran's 80 million inhabitants are under 30 years old.
In addition, Tehran is the 17th largest state (by area) in the world and is located at a strategic point in world trade, controlling part of the Strait of Hormuz. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Tehran has the fourth largest oil reserves in the world, representing 10% of the world's oil reserves, and Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, after the Russian Federation.
After this clarification, it is necessary to look back to the middle of the 20th century. Prior to 1979, Iran was a monarchy ruled by a shah (king). Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last representative of a monarchy that ruled for 2,500 years in Iran, took over in 1941 a parliamentary monarchy that sought to modernize the country, including the religious aspect.
The turning point came in 1953. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, democratically elected, wanted to nationalise Iran's oil wealth, mainly controlled by the Anglo-Iran Oil Company. To reverse this decision, through Operation Ajax, a successful coup d'état was carried out and Iran would become an absolute monarchy. In the 1960s, the parliament was dismissed and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi launched the White Revolution. This program proposed to accelerate the secularization of the country and to modernize the country economically.
The reforms, undertaken by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, upended the wealth and influence of the traditional landed classes upside down and led to rapid urbanization and westernization. The program was economically successful, but the benefits were unevenly distributed. The beginning of this program was with the introduction of the 1962 land reform. Under this law landowners were forced to relinquish ownership of vast tracts of land for redistribution to small cultivators.
These reforms eventually redistributed land to some 2.5 million families, established literacy and health bodies for the benefit of rural Iran, further reduced the autonomy of tribal groups, and advanced social and legal reforms that advanced the emancipation and empowerment of women.
Image 1: photo of women in Iran during the 1970s, before the Islamic Revolution. Source: https://www.reddit.com/r/OldSchoolCool/comments/2s9grg/1970s_women_in_iran/
In the following decades, Iranians' per capita income skyrocketed and oil revenues fueled a huge increase in state funding for industrial development projects. However this reform would begin to be criticized for the government's inability to put in place a comprehensive support system and infrastructure to replace the role of the landlord. In addition, this reform undermined the power of the Islamic clerics. The development of secular courts had already reduced clerical power over law and jurisprudence, and the reforms' emphasis on secular education further eroded the ulema's former monopoly in that field.
The shah's new policies were not without their critics, and the first critics of the White Revolution were the Shiite leaders. In 1963, a relatively obscure member of the ulema named Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini-a professor of philosophy at the Fayẕiyyeh Madrasah in Qom, who was granted the honor of ayatollah-spoke out harshly against the reforms of the White Revolution. As time went on, the shah, did not hesitate to use the SAVAK (Iran's former intelligence service) to suppress any glimmer of opposition. During the monarchy, the army remained loyal to the shah.
Oil revenues continued to fuel the Iranian economy in the 1970s. The shah was well aware of the danger of relying on a dwindling oil asset and pursued a policy of economic diversification. Iran had started automobile production in the 1950s and by the early 1970s was exporting vehicles. Moreover, in this decade, Tehran would start its nuclear program.
In addition, Iran made significant investments abroad. From this decade onwards, economic growth in Iran would stagnate and booming oil prices led to high inflation rates, and the purchasing power of Iranians and their general standard of living stagnated. In turn, traditional parties such as the National Front were marginalised, while others were outlawed. All forms of social and political protest, from both the intellectual left and the religious right, were subject to censorship, surveillance or harassment by SAVAK, and illegal arrests and torture were common.
For the first time, secular intellectuals were fascinated by the figure of Ayatollah Khomeini and abandoned their ideas of reducing the authority and power of the Shiite clerics. This led to these groups, many of them secular, joining with the clerics to overthrow the shah. The shah's socio-political repression increased, along with discontent with the monarchy. The shah's ties to the West and economic policies would light the fuse of social unrest.
In 1978, thousands of young madrassa (religious school) students took to the streets. The shah's repression heightened the sense of protest and sectors of the secular left and religious right - subsumed under the cloak of Shiite Islam and crowned themselves with the revolutionary war cry. While in exile in France, Khomeini coordinated this opposition by demanding the shah's abdication. In 1979, Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi and his family fled Iran, marking the triumph of the Islamic Revolution and the beginning of today's Iran.
Image 2: Ayatollah (Supreme Leader) Khomeini's return from exile. Source: https://www.lavanguardia.com/historiayvida/historia-contemporanea/20190531/47312521326/jomeini-el-hombre-que-cambio-iran.html
After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, the situation would change drastically. The leadership of the state would pass to the control of the atayollah (supreme leader), Khomeini. Despite the establishment of an Islamic republic, the majority of the Iranian population has been secular.
In domestic politics, the power of the Shiite clergy was consolidated as the elite of the new political system of the new republic and the groups that helped Khomeini come to power were neutralized. Also, political centralism was reinforced in Iran and due to Khomeini's distrust of the army's loyalty to the shah, the Revolutionary Guard was formed as a weapon of control and would become a "second army" loyal to the ayatollah. Regarding the role of women, women's participation in the workplace was reduced and a law was passed requiring all women to cover their heads in public.
Regarding the economy, after the 1979 revolution, the production of crude oil and other natural resources has been key for Iran. The state came to control 60% of the economy, applying a policy of state ownership and centralized planning. Ownership of companies by non-Iranian capital or individuals is very limited, and at least 51% of ownership is required to be in Iranian hands, making foreign investment difficult.
In foreign policy, Iran's relations with the US, the EU and, above all, Israel would worsen. During 1980-1988, the Iran-Iraq war provided a convenient excuse for the expansion of the state sector and the precipitous fall in living standards in general. At the same time, Washington endeavored to impose sanctions on Iran. In 1989, the death of Khomenei and the rise of Khamenei as Iran's supreme leader would mark a new page in Iran's recent history.
After the 1988 cease-fire with Iraq reflected the recognition that the country could not afford the cost of war on the economy or society. The costs were enormous: productivity plummeted. Urban poverty doubled. Real per capita income fell 45% since the revolution. And price controls and strict rationing of basic consumer goods failed to prevent runaway inflation.
In 1989, the growing political clout of the young population helped in the election of the former president, Mohammad Khatami. The newly elected president advocated a fundamental reorientation and liberalization of the Iranian economy, along with efforts to reverse Iran's international isolation.
In the first instance, post-war investment and the relaxation of government restrictions helped to generate strong growth in gross domestic product, government revenues and employment. Despite this initial improvement, the economic situation in Iran would not improve. Following the first steps in the development of the Iranian nuclear program, beginning in 1995, the U.S. would impose sanctions prohibiting the U.S. from trading with the Iranian oil industry, and Executive Order 12959, prohibiting Washington from trading with Iran. These sanctions would worsen the economic situation and along with it the disenchantment of the youth population.
In 2006, Tehran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol in 2006 and refused to respond satisfactorily to IAEA questions. This led the US and the EU in 2006 to start working together to develop new sanctions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-UNSC resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010). In addition, in 2010 and 2012, the US imposed new sanctions, increasing pressure on Iran by forcing foreign companies and banks to withdraw from Iran.
Unemployment among young people has almost doubled since 1990. About 22% of young people aged 15-29 are unemployed, accounting for 62% of the unemployed. Among men, about 18% cannot find a job. Among women, unemployment is estimated at around 40%. In addition, drug use and cultivation began to grow since 1979, especially among young people and women. In addition, social interaction between unmarried young men and women is officially prohibited.
Faced with this economic mismanagement, successive governments in Iran prioritized the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. After the war with Iraq (1980-1989), they became involved in construction and won important contracts. Their expansion into new sectors of the economy accelerated under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). In addition, other major beneficiaries have been a network of militias, which challenges local governments and states at odds with the authorities of the Ayatollah regime.
Since 2006-2007, the morality police, known as Gashta-e Ershah, was formed. This body is in charge of patrolling the streets and started to use physical violence and beatings, especially against women. Punishments for wearing the veil wrongly can range from being sent to a re-education center with a police record, to being beaten, whipped, raped or even killed.
At the societal level, in 2012, women made up 60% of university students. Nearly 70% of engineering graduates are women, one of the highest figures in the world. At the same time, Internet penetration levels in Iran are comparable to those in Italy, with some 60 million users, and the number is growing steadily: 70% of adults are members of at least one social media platform.
In contrast to state propaganda, only 40% of the population identifies as Muslim, while 9% said they are atheists. However, 47% said they had lost their religion during their lifetime, and 6% said they had changed from one religious orientation to another. Younger people reported higher levels of irreligiousness. These changes and the greater weight of the young population (under 30 years of age) in political life in Iran have led to increasing dissatisfaction with the regime over time.
The first sign was the "Green Movement" in 2009. Initially, there was a spontaneous uprising for two weeks after the June 12 elections due to electoral fraud in favor of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Protests escalated to include calls for political change and the condemnation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Riot police and paramilitary Basij forces violently suppressed the demonstrations in the immediate aftermath of the election, which attracted more than 40,000 Iranians. Between June 2009 and February 2010, more than 30 protesters were killed and 4,000 were arrested.
Thanks to the violence, the regime would manage to maintain control in Iran, and in 2013, Hassan Rouhani would be elected as Iran's president.
Rouhani prioritized ending the confrontation with the West (US and EU) that would free Iran from international sanctions. In November 2013, Iran, the US, China, Russia, the UK, France and Germany, plus the EU announced the Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA). On July 14, 2014, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was announced. This agreement will suspend and eventually remove major sanctions imposed on Iran. In return, Iran will limit its nuclear program.
This agreement allowed Iran to regain access to the international financial system, repatriated billions of dollars of frozen assets and returned to the oil market. Rouhani called for increased non-oil exports, setting a target of USD77.5 billion in annual non-oil exports in 2015. Two years into his presidency, Rouhani's most notable economic achievement was to reverse Iran's GDP contraction and reduce inflation. The economy grew by 3% in 2014 and inflation fell to 15.6% in early 2015.
However, this economic relief would be short-lived. In December 2017, demonstrators in Mashhad, Iran's second largest city, took to the streets to protest against the government's economic policies and high commodity prices. The demonstrations quickly spread across the country. The scope of the protests also expanded from economic problems to Iran's involvement in the Middle East and calls for regime change. However, these protests were disorganized and were quickly suppressed.
To this, in 2018, former U.S. President Donald Trump issued another Iran sanctions waiver saying this was "to secure agreement from our European allies to fix the terrible flaws in the Iran nuclear deal." and withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA in May 2018. Donald Trump imposed economic sanctions on Iran and adopted a tougher policy against Tehran. This new policy of former US President Donald Trump and domestic mismanagement meant a contraction of Iranian GDP by 6.03% in 2018 and, 6.78% in 2019. Iranian oil exports have fallen by around 60%.
The Iranian government would prioritize the Islamic Revolutionary Guard over the civilian population. This body has expanded into many other industries, such as banking, shipping, manufacturing and imports of consumer goods. In addition, they participate and operate in the black market. It is worth mentioning that they would have had a new opportunity to smuggle oil products.
This situation has triggered protests in 2019. On November 15, 2019, Iran raised gas prices - up to 300% - and introduced a new rationing system. The government's aim was to raise funds to help the poor, but it backfired. Protests spread across 100 cities over four days. The demonstrators protested against government measures, not for regime change. The regime authorities completely shut down the Internet and used repression to disband the protesters.
Although they managed to suppress the protests, in 2020, another wave of protests broke out after the authorities acknowledged that they had mistakenly shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752. All 176 people on board, including dozens of Iranians, were killed. Iranians were enraged by the government's incompetence and denial of responsibility for three days. In Tehran, protesters gathered on university campuses and chanted "Death to liars." On the second day, protests spread to other major cities despite the deployment of riot police, the Revolutionary Guards. The government would succeed in suppressing the demonstrations.
Along with this unrest, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic further affected Iran's economy. Tehran experienced the worst outbreak in the Middle East, with more than 6.2 million officially confirmed cases of infection and 131 thousand deaths by December 10, 2021 and, the inflation rate increased to 36.5% in 2020.
The effects of the pandemic, economic mismanagement and the impact of sanctions have increased domestic unrest in Iran. According to IMF estimates, the Islamic Republic's oil exports are expected to fall further in 2021. In addition to oil, Iran's industrial metals, a major source of the country's export revenue, were also sanctioned. To this, the Iranian currency failed to regain its pre-2018 value, while the inflation rate has continued to rise.
Alongside this, the current president Raisi has pushed for strict enforcement of the Islamic dress code and has expanded the morality police force. This situation would be the breeding ground for a new wave of protests to emerge.
In mid-September 2022, protests erupted across Iran following the death in prison of a young Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, for not wearing the hijab, or headscarf. She collapsed in a "re-education" center. The outcry over Amini's death reflected the growing opposition to the morality police as well as the dress code. Since September 17, 2022, more and more women have removed their headscarves in defiance of the mandatory dress code and despite repression, protesters are peacefully responding to this repression by calling for regime change.
Despite the crackdown, protests continue and the U.S., EU and other states have imposed new sanctions against the regime authorities for their repression of the protests. More and more Iranians of all ages and gender are taking to the streets. Moreover, the Islamic Republic "has lost legitimacy among its core supporters."
For the first time in recent years, anti-government demonstrations have taken place in more traditional and conservative cities, such as Qom and Mashhad. Despite the violent crackdown, protests continue in what is now one of the biggest challenges it has faced since the 1979 revolution.
An important factor will be whether the regime holds together, at a time when its supreme leader, Khamenei, is ill, and parts of the security forces do not defect. These protests could dismember and crumble the Islamic theocracy and allow Iran to adopt another political system and open itself to trade in order to prosper. Only time will tell if this wave of protests leads to a new revolution inside Iran.
Suggested readings:
1- BBC (2019) Iranian women - before and after the Islamic Revolution, BBC News. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47032829
2- Groot, K.de (2020) Iran protests, explained, Penn Today. Penn State University. Available at: https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/iran-protests-explained
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