Turkey is currently going through a delicate economic situation. However, Ankara is pursuing an ambitious foreign policy and megaprojects. The jewel in the crown is the controversial "Istanbul Canal", which continues to spark controversy.
The Bosphorus Strait was cited as one of eight global food security hotspots in a 2017 Chatham House report. 77% of wheat exports from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan pass through this strait and currently, there is no alternative sea route.
Recently, Ankara and Moscow have clashed in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. This indirect confrontation goes hand in hand with economic difficulties for Turkey. The Turkish economic situation compared to the early 2000s has partially worsened. Inflation should be mentioned. In Turkey, inflation went from around 5% in 2011 to around 20% in 2021.
Despite this adversity, Turkey adopted the "Mavi Vatan" or Blue Homeland strategic doctrine in an attempt to regain Turkish regional influence. Ankara has also ventured into the construction of mega-projects, where the Istanbul Canal plays a key role.
Recent history
Historically, the Bosphorus has been the scene of major historical power shifts, from the displacement of the Roman Empire to the seizure of the then Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453.
This control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Strait has been key to the evolution of the powers over time. In 1774, with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarjai, the Ottomans prohibited all foreign ships from leaving the Black Sea. This first treaty prevented Moscow from sending its Black Sea fleet to Japan in the 1904-1905 war against Japan.
Another example was in 1841, with the London Straits Convention prohibited non-Turkish warships from entering the strait in peacetime.
The Ottoman decline would accelerate in the early 20th century. During the Balkan War between 1912 and 1913, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its territories in Europe. Likewise, during World War I (1914-1918), the Ottomans entered the war on the side of the Central Powers.
In 1915, the decisive Turkish defense at Gallipoli spared Istanbul the humiliation of suffering another naval invasion. The post-World War I Treaty of Sèvres turned the strait into a peaceful international waterway.
However, the Treaty of Sèvres would be replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. In the Treaty of Lausanne, the European borders of Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey were defined. In turn, this treaty called for the demilitarization of the Daradanelles, other islands and the opening of the Aegean Sea to merchant ships.
However, the Montreux Convention signed in 1936, would take a new turn. This document established Turkish sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. At the same time, it prescribes full freedom of navigation for commercial vessels. At the same time, Article 19 restricts access to the Black Sea to the navies of states other than those of the Black Sea.
In peacetime, the restrictions are much looser and softer regarding transit, whereas if there is a possible war, according to Article 21 of the Montreux Convention, Turkey could legally close the straits.
Since 1945, Turkey occupied a key space in U.S. foreign policy. Ankara joined NATO in 1952, being a key place to contain the Soviet Union on the southern flank throughout the Cold War.
However, Turkey faced different difficulties concerning warship regimes. One example occurred after the end of the Cold War (1949-1991). The Ukrainian titanic aircraft carrier Varyag was sold to the Government of the People's Republic of China in 1998. Beijing persuaded Ankara to open the Bosporus to this ship.
Another sensitive issue was the imposition of pilotage and towing service fees in 1994. However, in 1998, they would become optional again after objections from Russia and other states in the International Maritime Organization.
The need for more effective regulation of the straits led to the establishment of the Turkish Straits Maritime Traffic Service, which began operating in the straits in 2003. According to data from the Turkish Maritime Affairs Directorate shows that, over the past 15 years, the tonnage of ships passing through the Bosphorus increased by 30%.
Graph 1: Traffic on the Bosphorus. Source: https://intellinews.com/turkey-s-crazy-canal-would-impact-eurasian-trade-geopolitics-209980/
During the 2011 election campaign, then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan unveiled a plan to build an artificial waterway in the European part of Istanbul to ease traffic congestion in the Bosphorus Strait.
Map 1: Location of the "Kanal Istanbul" (Istanbul Canal) Project. Source: https://www.24horas.cl/noticiasbbc/el-ambicioso-y-controversial-proyecto-con-que-turquia-quiere-abrir-un-canal-artificial-entre-europa-y-asia-2735149
The Istanbul Canal will be an artificial waterway 45 kilometers long, 275 meters wide and 20.75 meters deep that will run parallel to the Bosphorus and connect the Black Sea with the Marmara Sea.
According to the Turkish government the project, estimated at $10-20 billion, will reduce tanker traffic through the Bosphorus Strait and minimize the risks and dangers associated with maritime congestion.
This project has provoked quite a bit of criticism. According to the Turkish Chamber of Environmental Engineers, the canal would endanger Istanbul's precarious water supply and devastate the ecosystem between the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea.
Another argument put forward by maritime authorities and marine scientists stress that 66% of accidents in the Bosphorus in the last 15 years were due to technical failures and the number of accidents decreased by 39% thanks to a series of measures taken by the Turkish authorities since 1994.
In addition, ship captains point out that salvage operations will be more complicated in the Channel, due to its width of only 275 meters. Retired generals and admirals fear that the Canal will adversely affect the defense of the European part of Istanbul by isolating Thrace from the rest of Turkey.
These reasons led some of Turkey's largest banks to be reluctant to finance the project on environmental grounds, while contemplating the risks inherent in financing such a large project that could be frustrated at a later stage.
In 2017, construction of the Istanbul Canal was announced to start in 2018, but eventually the project was postponed and put on hold until the end of 2019.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2018, it was reported that China was willing to invest $65 billion in the project and could immediately transfer $30 billion as a deposit.
Another major player in this project is Qatar. The mother of the emir of Qatar, Sheikha Moza bin Nasser, owns land acquired on the route of the Istanbul Canal, an artificial waterway planned to link the Black and Marmara Seas.
Apart from these two players, financial institutions from the Netherlands, Belgium and Russia are also reportedly interested in this project.
On December 18, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, "In Montreux, we are not granted any rights. Ships come and go through the Strait as they want [...]. The Istanbul Canal will not be like that. We will have a new legal regime when we make this investment, just like in the Suez Canal and others."
On December 23, 2019, Erdogan stated:
"The Istanbul Canal would reveal what Turkey had gained and lost because of the Convention." This prompted 126 retired ambassadors to issue a joint statement calling for the abandonment of this project.
In 2020, former Transport and Infrastructure Minister Cahit Turhan said that the first excavation of Istanbul Canal would be carried out in 2020 and the works would be completed in 2026.
Criticism of this project was unceasing. The current mayor of the city of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, is a member of the Republican People's Party (CHP for its acronym in Turkish). The current mayor of Istanbul stated in 2019, on Twitter the following:
"If the Istanbul Canal project becomes a reality, #Istanbul will lose its surface and groundwater resources forever. No sensible politician can support such a project at a time when #climatechange is causing unprecedented damage to our planet's water resources."
According to a survey conducted by the Istanbul City Council, 64.2% of the inhabitants are opposed to this project. On the other hand, 67.1% of respondents said that the Istanbul Canal was not a pressing need for the city, and only 32.9% said it was.
The situation again became tense with the publication of an open letter signed by 104 retired admirals on April 3, 2021. The letter called on the government to "refrain from any action that could turn the Montreux Convention into a matter of international controversy."
In response, the Turkish government arrested ten of the retired admirals, including Cem Gürdeniz for "using force and violence to get rid of the constitutional order."
International implications
This project has not only generated controversy within Turkey, but also outside. Several actors are watching Turkey's moves on the issue.
For the European Union (EU), maintaining the status quo is important for its energy and security interests. Brussels receives much of its oil through the Bosporus, may be concerned about the potential increase in transportation costs due to transit tolls associated with the new canal, and could increase tension between Turkey and Greece.
However, Brussels could use the Barcelona and Bucharest Conventions against the project and currently, the provisions relating to the Montreux Convention allow Romanian and Bulgarian naval vessels to pass through the Strait without restrictions. In the event of any threat from its members, the EU could opt for a revision of the terms of the Convention.
Brussels is not the only actor concerned about this project and Russia is also not failing to observe the course of this project.
For Moscow, the importance of the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) increased with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The Turkish Straits provide a unique connection between Moscow's naval bases in Tartus, Syria and on the Black Sea. Moscow also relies on the Turkish Straits to export its wheat, oil and natural gas, tolls for using the new channel could make it less economical to transport goods, which would have negative consequences for the Russian economy. In turn, this channel could open up to U.S. Navy ships in the Black Sea.
Map 2: Middle Corridor Initiative, within the Chinese BRI Initiative. Source: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-cok-tarafli-ulastirma-politikasi.tr.mfa
Beijing did not stand idly by. Ankara signed a memorandum of understanding with China in 2015 to align its own "Middle Corridor Initiative" linking Turkey and Europe with China via a trans-Carpathian, east-west route. In 2017, President Erdogan attended a forum in China on the Belt and Road. The ambitions of Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative to ensure connectivity with Europe inevitably pass through Turkey, which connects the two continents of Europe and Asia.
For Ankara, this project could turn Erdogan's head. The management of the new canal would depend on Turkish will. Turkey could gain political power to govern the naval traffic as they want and, obviously, for the price they consider best. In turn, this project could weaken the Russian position in the region, allowing to open the Black Sea to the US Navy in case of a direct confrontation.
This channel would be the perfect playing card for Erdogan in two respects.
Firstly, in domestic politics it would be the perfect opportunity ahead of the 2023 presidential elections and it was estimated that the channel would be operational in 2023, marking the 100th anniversary of the creation of the Turkish Republic and silencing the opposition.
Secondly, this channel would allow Turkey to be treated as a geopolitical heavyweight and to have a seat at the table in discussions on the future of Eurasia, the Middle East, Europe and North Africa.
Erdogan will not break with the Convention because it could undermine Turkey's ambitions. It should not be forgotten that Ankara has become one of the major regional powers, showing its desire to shape the dynamics of the future of Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa. Only time will tell whether this channel will change the future of Turkey and the other players or whether it will be a personal whim of the current Turkish president.
Recommended bibliography:
AKTAŞ, I., 2021. Turkey's new foreign policy road map. Daily Sabah, [online] Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/turkeys-new-foreign-policy-road-map
Kalinov, T., 2019. Canal Istanbul Challenges and Opportunities and their Relationship to the Security. [ebook] Istanbul: ocerints. Available at: https://www.ocerints.org/socioint19_e-publication/abstracts/papers/276.pdf
Siccardi, F., 2021. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy. [online] Carnegie Europe. Available at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/09/14/how-syria-changed-turkey-s-foreign-policy-pub-8530
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