It is impossible to be certain about what happened in Russia last Friday.
At the moment, there are two main theories among the expert community. On the one hand, there are those who suspect that all this has been nothing more than a massive hoax. On the other, that the events have been genuine and their consequences will be profound. Nevertheless, the 36-hour crisis will mark a turning point in Russia's domestic politics and internal stability, especially for Vladimir Putin.
In this note, several key questions will be explained: what is the Wagner group and its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, why now and what are the implications for both Russia and the other actors.
The Wagner Group is an unofficial Russian paramilitary organisation operating in different regions of the world. It is a network of private companies and militias made up of mercenaries who operate clandestinely, as Russian law does not allow such organisations.
The Wager Group was founded in 2014 by Dmitri Utkin, a former lieutenant colonel in the Russian intelligence special forces. The name alludes to the German composer Richard Wagner, and Utkin is believed to have chosen it because of his Nazi sympathies. Yevgeny Prigozhin, however, has been his financier and Wagner's leader.
In the 1990s, Prigozhin set up a hot dog business, and later a luxurious restaurant where Vladimir Putin would bring prestigious guests. Both Wagner and Prigozhin have been active since 2014, first in Ukraine, supporting the Russian army and pro-Russian militias in Crimea and the Donbas.
Over time, this group has expanded into other states, for example, in 2015, landing in Syria to support Russian troops in the civil war. Its purpose was to secure access to oil and gas for Bashar al-Assad's regime.
Map 1: The Wagner Group Uprising. Source: https://fredalvarez.blogspot.com/2023/06/36-horas-extranas-y-caoticas-en-rusia.html
Its presence has been confirmed in at least eleven countries, mostly in Africa. The Kremlin has penetrated Mali, Sudan and Mozambique through security agreements between the company and their governments. Wagner also offers assistance and training to local troops in exchange for access to gold and precious metal reserves.
On the one hand, Wagner has become a key player for the Kremlin. On the other hand, Prigozhin has built up a network of contacts within the army, the security forces and within the Russian ruling elite. It is worth mentioning that Prigozhin worked with Russian General Surovikin in Syria.
However, this group would become even more important with the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022. For months, Prigozhin toured various Russian prisons, recruiting 1,000 convicts to fight in Ukraine.
In the face of heavy Russian army setbacks in Ukraine and heavy human losses, the Wagner group has played a leading role in Russia's advance into Ukraine, particularly in Soledar and the city of Bajmut.
As Wagner has become more and more prominent, the struggle between Prigozhin and the Russian Defence Ministry, led by Sergei Shoigu, has increased. On 14 January 2023, the ministry claimed the capture of the Ukrainian city of Soledar, but made no mention of Wagner's role in its conquest.
Over the past few months, Prigozhin has appeared in videos in front of dead bodies of his soldiers, and following the withdrawal of Wagner's forces in the city of Bakhmut, he has also continued to criticise Russia's Defence Ministry and Russian elites. In addition, Prigozhin has been critical of the war in Ukraine. It is important to clarify that Prigozhin does not criticise the war, but rather Russia's failure in this war, in order to occupy a position in Russian public opinion of a man who fought loyally for Russia and won a significant victory.
The background that would trigger the mutiny on 23-24 June was an order from Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu that any detachment of volunteers must be integrated into the Russian army and therefore sign contracts with the portfolio to legalise their status by 1 July.
However, Prigozhin disagreed and said his men would "never" sign. Prigozhin thus sought to get Vladimir Putin personally involved and to take action against the army command.
The mutiny began on the night of Friday 23 June, when the Wagner mercenary group accused the Russian army of shelling them in Ukraine, and Prigozhin announced a "March for Justice", not with the aim of overthrowing Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Within hours, thousands of Wagner mercenaries, commanded by Yevgeny Prizoghin, had taken the Russian border town of Rostov-on-Don with little resistance. Moreover, some Russians were euphoric and most seemed apathetic. What was not visible was anyone in any Russian city spontaneously expressing personal support for Putin.
This lack of resistance indicates that Russian security forces were unwilling to join him, but also unwilling to stop him. This would, according to Mark Galeotti, show a real demonstration of the weakness of the Russian state, especially Vladimir Putin.
As Wagner advanced towards Moscow, Vladimir Putin, in a message to the nation, announced dire consequences for traitors and vowed to crush what he called "an armed mutiny". In turn, the Federal Security Service (FSB) opened a criminal case against Prigozhin for "provoking an armed uprising".
When Wagner's ranks were less than 500km from Russia's capital, Moscow, an agreement in principle was negotiated between the Kremlin and the Wagner group, mediated by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. In this agreement:
Wagner's forces that did not join what Putin called a "rebellion" will not be prosecuted and will join the Russian Defence Ministry.
The leader of the Russian mercenaries, Yevgeny Prigozhin, would go into exile in Belarus.
The members of the Wagner Group agreed to move to Belarus, where they cannot be prosecuted for the rebellion that began last Friday.
The Russian authorities would also drop a criminal case against their Wagner mercenary force.
After this apparent return to calm, the repercussions of this crisis will remain latent over time. First and foremost, whatever happens in the coming days, Putin's image will inevitably be weakened by this crisis.
His regime has been built on three pillars. The first is the premise of strength and infallibility around him. The second is the large amounts of money to cover up any problems and the control of the security apparatus. On the last, the backing of the security apparatus. But if anything has become clear in the last twenty-four hours, it is that his control is clear for all to see.
It is important to remember that this crisis comes a year before Russia's presidential elections. Putin now faces a stark choice between tolerance and purges. If he tolerates rebellion, he will look weak. If he purges his regime, he risks another rebellion.
In Russia it is rumoured that Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister, was Prigozhin's main target, will be forced to resign after being accused of some form of corruption. There are reports that Prigozhin had reason to be concerned for the lives of members of his own family and other Wagner leaders.
On 1 July, Wagner was to cease to exist as a separate entity, at least formally speaking. Like all private armies, it was to be subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, i.e. to Shoigu. This helps explain, I think, the timing of the mutiny. If Wagner had ceased to function as before, Prigozhin would have lost a lot of money.
The division in Russia was real, and will probably last. Putin is reluctant to the new mobilisation called for by the generals because he knows there would be a massive popular reaction. Importantly, much of Putin's political identity is wrapped up in the idea that he is a strongman who knows how to defend Russia.
In addition, another of Putin's nightmares is the implosion of Russia and its territorial fragmentation. The regions are not seeking to break away and the state apparatus remains quite strong. The bureaucratic state functions.
In the short term, the internal power struggle will increase as this mutiny has delegitimised Russian President Putin. Putin will have to reassess the situation and possibly implement institutional and personnel changes. He may question the oversight of the F.S.B., Russia's secret services, and purge senior commanders in public support of the state and condemnation of Prigozhin and the elites who fled Moscow in haste.
When trying to generate a system without politics, any politics feels like a challenge to the legitimacy of the state. A system built on the management of rivalries starts to look fragile when rivals are noisy and armed. History never repeats itself, but it does rhyme from time to time.
Suggested readings:
Díaz Villanueva, F. (2023) Putin, Prisionero de la Historia, Vozpópuli. Available at: https://www.vozpopuli.com/opinion/putin-prisionero-historia.html
Pedro, N. de (2023) ¿Qué ha pasado en rusia y cuál es la situación de putin hoy?, El Español. Available at: https://www.elespanol.com/opinion/tribunas/20230625/pasado-rusia-situacion-putin-hoy/774292564_12.html
SNYDER, T. (2023) ‘Prigozhin’s March on Moscow (corrected)’, Thinking About, 26 June. Available at: https://snyder.substack.com/p/prigozhins-march-on-moscow?r=f9j4c&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
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