Water plays a key role in the current geopolitical chessboard. Recently, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia have been fighting over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This project will be a dynamic that will affect Africa.
Just as oil determined world geopolitics in the 20th century, water has the power to reorder international relations in the current century. A potential water fight could occur sooner than expected in Africa over the course of the Nile River. The Nile River is central to the development of several African states and has recently been the subject of confrontation. This tension has been heightened between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, mainly over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The foundations of the Arab world were shaken in the 2011 uprisings, which still reverberate in the region. However, this earthquake shifted geopolitical sands much further afield. This confrontation between Ethiopia and Egypt began in 2011, when Ethiopia took advantage of Egypt's distraction with the Arab revolts to begin construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile, adjacent to the other side of the border with Sudan.
For the former Ethiopian government, led by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the Grand Renaissance Dam, which began construction in 2020, will be the largest power plant on the continent. The dam has become a symbol for Ethiopia as it could not only generate enough electricity to supply Ethiopia's energy needs, but also Addis Ababa could become an energy exporter in the region and internationally. This mega-project also aims to upgrade Ethiopia's economy with two objectives. The first is to be able to supply its population with electricity. It is estimated that, to date, 60 million Ethiopians still do not have direct access to electricity. GERD would also become an economic asset for the diversification of Ethiopia's exports, where the exploitation and export of hydropower would play a major role for Ethiopia.
At the same time, Egypt depends on the Nile for about 96% of its water consumption. Cairo fears that the dam will drastically reduce its available water flow, something that is and will be vital to the country for decades to come. Egypt has demanded guarantees from Ethiopia that it will receive a minimum flow of water, a commitment the Ethiopian government is unwilling to grant. Egypt also fears that Ethiopia will build other dams on the Blue Nile, where Egypt's share would eventually be severely reduced in the future.
Sudan could benefit from Ethiopian energy exports, as the country has significant deficiencies in this sector. However, GERD is located 15 kilometers from one of its national dams and would seriously compromise water reserves. This pressing need is compounded by climate change, which is causing the flow of the Nile to decline.
Map 1: The Nile dam project. Ethiopia's construction on the Blue Nile is raising tensions with Egypt. Source: https://scx2.b-cdn.net/gfx/news/2019/niledamscheme.jpg
The conflict between Addis Ababa and Cairo is not limited to the management of the GERD, but is the expression of a long-standing dispute involving the 11 countries that form the Nile River Basin. The countries south of the Nile River Basin - Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania - do not recognize the "Nile Water Agreements" signed between Egypt and the United Kingdom during the colonial era. These agreements were later updated in 1959 between the new states of Egypt, Sudan and the United Kingdom.
The Nile Water Agreements divided the flow of the Nile: 75% of the total for Egypt and 25% for Sudan. In addition, they granted themselves veto power over the construction of any dam in the region that might limit its reserves. These agreements have not been recognized by any upstream state.
Under the government of former President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt complacently maintained its hegemonic position over the waters of the Nile. Although the mouth of the Nile is in Egypt and it is the most downstream country, Cairo was able to maintain its hegemony due to its internal stability and its demographic and military might. Egypt refused for years to join the Nile Basin Initiative, formed by 11 riparian countries to reorganize the use of its water resources, and maintained its "historical and natural right" to a 75% share of the river's waters.
En 2010, siete países que conforman la Iniciativa de la Cuenca del Nilo acordaron la firma del llamado Acuerdo de Entebbe. Este acuerdo aspira a modificar de forma sustancial el reparto del agua del Nilo, plasmando el principal objetivo de los estados que conforman la Iniciativa de la Cuenca del Nilo. Tanto Egipto como Sudán se opusieron frontalmente a la firma de este acuerdo. Esta tensión por las aguas del Nilo, recientemente acrecentada entre Egipto, Sudán y Etiopía, principalmente por la construcción de la Gran Presa del Renacimiento Etíope; hay 4 períodos destacables.
Durante el primer período de esta pugna (2011-2017) se produjeron tensos enfrentamientos diplomáticos entre El Cairo y Addis Abeba. Entre 2011 y 2017, los líderes de Egipto y Etiopía sacaron el conflicto a la palestra con términos hipernacionalistas y con intercambio de amenazas en tono belicista. Los políticos de El Cario instaron al sabotaje de la construcción de la planta y los medios de comunicación secundaron este planteamiento. Pese que el control de las aguas del Nilo es un aspecto prioritario para Egipto, El Cairo no ha sido capaz de imponer sus posturas frente a la ofensiva etíope. Etiopía ha hecho valer su derecho soberano al desarrollo de la Gran Presa del Renacimiento Etíope apoyado por la mayoría de los diez países de la Iniciativa de la Cuenca del Nilo. Asimismo, Sudán que ha sido un tradicional aliado egipcio acercó posturas con Etiopía.
This isolation of Egypt prompted Cairo to adopt a new policy on the matter and, from 2015, diplomatic channels and rapprochement would gain ground in this dispute. In 2015, with the dam already at almost 60% of its construction, the leaders of Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan signed the Declaration of Principles that would be the first basis for seeking a solution to this dispute. This preliminary document of understanding accepted Ethiopia's right to build the dam without damaging the water supply of both countries or, if not, to offer compensation. This Ethiopian compensation, based on the promise of considerable economic benefits for Sudan, would cause Sudan to change sides, putting pressure on Egypt. In that agreement, an independent analysis commission was proposed to observe the possible consequences of the dam.
Recently there has been a rapprochement that has managed to mitigate the war drums. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Cairo in June 2018 and pledged to ensure that the development of Ethiopian projects would not harm Egypt. In turn, Egyptian President Adelfatah El Sisi stated that his country ruled out the military path to solve the crisis. Likewise, at the end of 2019, the United States hosted talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan in order to reach an agreement on water sharing. The U.S. was very present in the negotiation phases that took place during 2019 and the Secretary of the Treasury declared the country's commitment to help solve the problem. In January 2020, the three countries reached an agreement on the main points of dispute and pledged to ratify the commitment in February. However, to date, the agreement has not been ratified.
After several years of intense diplomatic rapprochement, during the summer of 2020, tensions escalated, as Cairo, seeing that the date for filling the dam was approaching, opted to adopt a more aggressive policy. In June 2020, Egypt petitioned the UN Security Council to pass a resolution that would give international weight to efforts to resolve the GERD dispute. This action was not well received by the Ethiopian government, but the meetings in the Security Council were held. At first, there was an informal session and two days later the official meeting was held with all concerned countries present to reach an agreement in principle on this tension. However, Sudan's ambassador to the UN, Omer Mohamed Siddig, called on the leaders of the three countries involved to: "demonstrate their political will and commitment by resolving the few outstanding issues (the amount of water Ethiopia will release downstream of the dam)". Tensions continued to rise between the countries and cross threats of no fear of conflict became a daily basis.
Image 1: Negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the filling of the dam. Source: https://www.descifrandolaguerra.es/crisis-del-nilo-ii/
Ethiopia extended the deadline by two weeks to reach a conclusive agreement, three days before the dam is to be filled. On the other hand, the country refused to halt construction projects related to the dam. However, the situation changed on June 27 with a tripartite agreement. The agreement was reached at a meeting between the three countries with the participation of South Africa as mediator and representative of the African Union. One difference from the US-sponsored tripartite agreement is that Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have agreed to seek an "African Solution" to resolve the deadlock over GERD. This tripartite agreement agreed to continue negotiations and to focus for the time being on prioritizing the development of a binding legal agreement on the rules for filling and operating the Renaissance Dam.
The Nile River spans eleven countries with two main tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile. In 2011, alarms were raised about a hypothetical water war due to Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. For Addis Ababa, this dam is key not only to fill the current domestic electricity shortage, but also to ensure that in the current process of Ethiopian economic modernization, power generation and export begins to play a prominent economic role. While Sudan stands to benefit from this project, as it could address domestic shortcomings in this sector, Egypt fears that the dam will reduce the flow of the river that irrigates Sudan and provides about 90% of the country's fresh water. This dispute highlights the expiration date of the agreement signed in 1959 between the United Kingdom, Sudan and Egypt, under which 75% of the total flow of the Nile would go to Egypt and 25% to Sudan. However, the other stakeholders, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania have never recognized the 1959 agreement. The latter have also promoted the Nile Basin Initiative and, in 2010, took the first step towards modifying the sharing of Nile water.
After years of hard negotiation and easing of tensions between Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia announced a tripartite agreement mediated by the USA, which has not been ratified and which, in the summer of 2020, caused the worst omens to come true. However, on June 27, 2020, the three countries agreed to resume diplomatic channels to settle this dispute.
The Egyptian Minister of Irrigation, Mohamed Abdel Aty, after meeting with US officials in Cairo, stated that his country showed great flexibility during the various stages of the negotiations because of its desire to reach a fair and binding agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD, taking into account the specific procedures for dealing with different cases of drought.
In turn, Abdel Aty pointed to the damage inflicted on Sudan as a result of Ethiopia's unilateral filling of the dam's reservoir in 2020, when Sudan suffered a severe drought followed by massive flooding.
Ethiopia claims it successfully completed the second filling as planned, with a capacity of 13.5 billion cubic meters of water, contradicted by Egyptian and Sudanese experts. To this, Addis Ababa confirmed that it will start producing 700 megawatts of electricity from the GERD next year, increasing Ethiopian electricity generation capacity by 14%.
Since the end of 2020, Ethiopia has been experiencing a civil war between the Federal Government led by Abiy Ahmed and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). This internal instability will not only mark the internal future, but could also mark a card for or against one of the three parties involved in this struggle. The future of this dispute over the Nile's water resources is uncertain. Negotiations are arduous and slow because any small detail that is not taken into account could change the course of the negotiations and mark the future of the three countries and the region. We will have to wait and see how this dynamic ends and who will be the real winner, or if there really is one.
Recommended bibliography:
Mbaku, J., 2020. The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/
Stark, A., 2021. Water wars? The Role of Hegemony in the Jordan River, Nile River and Columbia River Basins. E-International Relations. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/25/water-wars-the-role-of-hegemony-in-the-jordan-river-nile-river-and-columbia-river-basins/
Original article published September 30, 2020, in Epojé, formerly known as Revista Libertaria. For additional information: https://epoje.es/la-gran-presa-etiope-del-renacimiento-una-pugna-por-el-nilo/
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