Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia's bloody war in Ukraine has copied analysis and the spotlight. However, tensions between Greece and Turkey were on the verge of erupting into open warfare.
Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia's bloody and unjustified war against Ukraine has been in the spotlight and analysis. However, last September 3, 2022, at a public event, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Greece of occupying islands in the Aegean, where the two neighbours have long been at loggerheads over a series of territorial disputes.
The Eastern Mediterranean has been the cradle of Western civilization, and the birthplace of some of the greatest empires mankind has ever known. At the same time, this region is a bridge connecting three continents. Given its geostrategic location, it has also been throughout history a focus of conflicts and a generator of tensions that in one way or another ended up being reflected in other regions.
Since 2010, the eastern Mediterranean has become a key point of interest for the energy market after significant natural gas and oil reserves were discovered in its waters. These discoveries have made the powers that be move their chips. During 2019 and 2020, tensions between Greece and Turkey, two NATO member states, were on the verge of erupting into open warfare. In the following, article we want to shed some light how these two actors came to this tension and what is the reason.
The geography of the Aegean Sea is complex, with more than 2,400 islands, mostly Greek, but also with offshore sea routes that are Turkey's economic and security lifeline. Both Athens and Ankara are vying for control of: maritime zones, airspace, natural resources, militarization of this region.
To better understand this dispute we must go back to WWI. The Ottoman Empire, later Turkey, was on the losing side during World War I, along with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany. Ankara was forced to sign the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which stipulated that the Ottoman Empire was reduced to a fraction of the Anatolian peninsula.
Map 1: borders stipulated in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). Source: http://gabinetedehistoria.blogspot.com/2014/07/iraque-tensoes-e-conflitos-que-se.html
This treaty was imposed by the allies on the Sultan, but was rejected by the Turkish majority, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the War of Independence would begin. Atatürk and the Turkish nationalists won the war against the allies and abolished the sultanate, giving birth to the young republic of Turkey. The Treaty of Sèvres was renegotiated, and Ankara retained almost all of its territory in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
However, Turkey recognized British possession of Cyprus and the Italian-controlled islands of the Dodecanese. In addition, the Turkish straits between the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea were declared open to all shipping (under international control). In 1937, with the Treaty of Montreal, Turkey regained sovereignty over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, but the Aegean islands and the important island of Kastellorizo were to remain under Greek sovereignty.
During WWII, Greece fell under the control of Nazi Germany in 1941, and during 1942 - 1944, there was fierce resistance to the occupation by the communist and monarchist Hellenic factions. Meanwhile, Turkey maintained its neutrality throughout this conflict. After WWII, both Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952.
In 1960, during a meeting in Geneva between Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, they would be the guarantors of the sovereignty of Cyprus after its independence in 1960. The meeting served as a platform for the parties to present their positions, but did not lead to a concrete outcome.
Tensions between the two nations would erupt in the 1970s. Athens engineered a coup d'état in Cyprus in 1974 with the intention of uniting Cyprus with Greece, and Turkey would invade the island, occupying the north of the island. A decade later, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their own republic, recognized only by Turkey, in northern Cyprus. In July 1975, Turkey created a new army division in the coastal province of Smyrna, known as the 4th or Aegean Army.
In August 1976, Turkey sent the research vessel Sismik I (Hora) into disputed waters claimed by Greece, escorted by a warship. Greece responded by putting its armed forces on alert. Washington succeeded in defusing tensions, promising military aid to Greece and the removal of an arms embargo it had imposed to punish Turkey for its 1974 invasion of Cyprus.
Athens and Ankara signed the Berne Protocol in November 1976, agreeing on the principles for their negotiations on the disputed continental shelf claims.
In 1981, negotiators addressed sensitive issues, such as the delimitation of the maritime zones around the eastern Greek islands close to the Turkish coast, and even tentatively broached the idea of joint energy exploration, but the Cyprus issue would spoil any glimmer of peace.
In 1982, the vast majority of states signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the mid-1990s, Greece ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Under this convention each state has the right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean from 6 to 12 nautical miles.
In the 1980s, tensions increased following the Turkish deployment of the seismic research vessel Piri Reis, flanked by two warships, in waters outside Greek territorial seas, leading to a military confrontation in March 1987.
In December 1995, there was almost an open conflict between these two states after a Turkish bulk carrier ran aground on the uninhabited islet of Imia. Encouraged by the respective media, Greek and Turkish citizens and armies rushed to raise the national flag on the islet.
The first round of exploratory talks between the two states began in 2002. In 2004, the parties appeared closer than ever to reaching an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf, territorial seas and airspace in the disputed areas of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the waters would maintain a tense calm.
In addition, the EU offered Nicosia a path to membership in 2003, and some within the bloc argued that the prospect would encourage Turkish Cypriots to support the reunification of Cyprus, under the Annan Plan.
In May 2006, a Turkish and a Greek military aircraft collided south of Rhodes, resulting in the death of a Greek pilot, both sides took advantage of contacts at the level of chiefs of staff to minimize tensions. In the following decade, Greece allowed Turkish citizens to visit its eastern Aegean islands without visas, and high-level delegations from each side met within the framework of the so-called High-Level Cooperation Council.
A U.S. Geological Survey report in 2010 estimated the existence of more than three trillion cubic meters of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil off the Eastern Mediterranean coast. In 2011, the U.S. oil company ExxonMobil, the Italian company Eni and the French company Total discovered gas fields in the waters off Cyprus.
Map 2: Territorial claims of Greece and Turkey. Source: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-53520700
This discovery of gas on the Mediterranean seabed, in Cyprus in 2011, Egypt in 2015, worried Ankara of being left out, along with its allies the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, since the Arab Revolts of 2011, the interests of Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and Israel, began to converge to counter Turkey. It should be mentioned that, these three states would approve the construction of a gas pipeline, the EatMed, of 1,900 km to Europe for gas extracted from the eastern Mediterranean, bypassing Turkey.
Following the discovery of gas off the coast of Cyprus, major international energy companies started exploration in 2011, accelerating the pace from 2016, trying to turn the region into an energy alternative to Russia.
During these years, the naval and strategic doctrine of Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) was adopted. This doctrine attempts to avoid two major Turkish fears: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are being excluded from potential energy wealth; while, other Mediterranean states are pursuing a policy of containment that will detract from Turkey's sovereignty, economic security and geopolitical reach.
Under this doctrine, the strategic independence that Turkey would gain from having an EEZ commensurate with its history is a matter of national interest. Moreover, the restitution of sovereignty over the Greek islands off the Turkish coast, such as Kastelorizo, would allow Ankara greater strategic autonomy and an energy hub.
Following the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan and his AKP Party increasingly relied on the support of nationalists in parliament and among state cadres. This shift in rhetoric and diplomacy would increase from the beginning of 2018, when the Turkish government shifted to an even harder line in its Eastern Mediterranean policy.
Map 3: Exclusive Economic Zone arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean. Source: https://thepoliticalroom.com/las-raices-historicas-del-ultimo-conflicto-entre-turquia-y-grecia/
In November 2019, Turkey agreed with the Libyan government in Tripoli on a surprising Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by which it links the coast of Cyrenaica with southern Turkey, crossing the EEZ of several Greek islands. Turkey decided to suspend this exploration work under German pressure, in order to facilitate a diplomatic agreement between Greece and Turkey on the issue of the disputed EEZs.
In response, Egypt and Greece took the opportunity to delimit their EEZs. This was interpreted by Turkey as a maneuver against its interests, since the Greek EEZ bordering Egypt's is the same zone that Turkey claims as its own.
Tensions between Ankara and Athens would escalate in 2020. The Turkish ship, Oruç Reis, entered disputed waters southeast of Karpathos for about 24 hours. Greek officials put the military on high alert. As a result, Greece is bringing out its own military muscle. In 2020, the Hellenic government increased its defense spending from €3.4 billion to €5.5 billion after years of cuts following the 2008 debt crisis.
By the end of 2020, Erdogan due to domestic economic pressure, wanted to "turn a new page" in ties with the EU. In March, the Turkish foreign minister revived the possibility of a maritime agreement with Egypt. Turkey and Israel have also hinted at normalizing relations, although major disagreements remain. In December 2020, Turkey said that Israel's hydrocarbon resources would be traded more efficiently to other markets through Turkey. In addition, Ankara has moved closer and improved ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Despite this Turkish rapprochement; Greece has maintained and strengthened its ties with Israel, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Athens intends to change the balance of power in the Aegean through a series of military purchases from the United States and France. Turkey has been kicked out of the F-35 joint strike fighter program for the purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, while Greece has become part of the program, seeking to acquire up to 40 F-35 aircraft.
Last September 3, 2022, at a public event, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Greece of occupying islands in the Aegean. These statements come at a delicate moment for the Turkish and Greek leaders. Next year, general elections are due to be held in both states. In Turkey, the main Turkish opposition party, CHP for its acronym in Turkish, would wrest power from Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In addition, Ankara is experiencing a delicate economic situation, with an official inflation rate of 80%.
In a recent poll, conducted by Metropoll between Aug. 13-17 in 28 Turkish provinces among 1,717 citizens, 52 percent said the crisis with Greece was caused by the elections, and only 26.2 percent disagreed. Moreover, despite historical tensions, 64 percent did not consider Greece an enemy nation.
Greek-Turkish conflict in the eastern Mediterranean is unlikely but not entirely unthinkable. Fear of such an escalation, economic problems and concern about damage to their respective ties with other regional powers have prompted Athens and Ankara to re-engage in exploratory talks for now. However, fears that the calm waters may be strained may be heightened due to the low trust between the two states, and a failure in diplomacy. Only time will tell which player will or will not win this struggle, and control key transportation and energy routes for all.
Suggested readings:
Aydintasbas, A. and Ülgen, S., 2022. A Conflict Could Be Brewing in the Eastern Mediterranean. Here’s How to Stop It.. Carnegie Europe. Available at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/09/17/conflict-could-be-brewing-in-eastern-mediterranean.-here-s-how-to-stop-it-pub-82759
Centre, F., 2018. The recent crisis between Greece and Turkey: Two NATO allies on the brink of war, again. The Foreign Policy Centre. Available at: https://fpc.org.uk/the-recent-crisis-between-greece-and-turkey/
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