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Writer's pictureLaura Rodríguez

Turkey in Central Asia, back to the roots or pragmatism?

Central Asia is a key region in world geopolitics and little studied. In recent decades, Ankara has shown increased interest in this region and has used two tools to gain influence.

According to the English politician and geographer Halford J. Mackinder, in the "heartland" theory, he stated that whoever controlled the Central Asian area had a good chance of controlling the rest of Asia and Europe and obtaining a privileged position to control the world. There are discrepancies with respect to this statement, but in recent years Central Asia has returned to the geostrategic chessboard where the great powers are playing key games.


In a previous article, we analyzed how China is playing its cards in the region. The most important project for Beijing, the "New Silk Road" was presented in Kazakhstan in 2013. However, there is another player that has also quietly gained weight in this region, Turkey.


The ties between Ankara and the Central Asian states go back centuries. However, recent ties between the two players date back to the late 20th century.


After the end of World War II, Turkey would become one of the most significant allies for the U.S. militarily and geo-strategically. This meant that, for decades, Ankara prioritized its foreign relations with the West, e.g. the long-standing annexation to the European Union since the 1960s.


However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are discussions within Turkey to start changing its domestic and international policy objectives. After the long tension over a hypothetical accession to the current European Union, Turkey made a U-turn and looked eastward.


Ankara was one of the first states to recognize the independence of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.


Turkey sent an invitation to their respective leaders, with the exception of Tajikistan, to Ankara as the first official trip abroad. Despite deep cultural and linguistic ties, Moscow has maintained a strong influence in the region and Ankara failed in this first attempt. Turkey also had to deal with a number of internal economic and terrorism issues.


In turn, the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TİKA) was created and Central Asia became the main recipient region for funds and projects carried out by that agency and in 1993, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (Türksoy) was founded, which would set a precedent for the founding of the Turkic Council.


From 2003 onwards, this strategy changed when the AKP came to power in Turkey. In the first instance, Turkish civil and political society maintained a position in favor of Turkish accession to the European Union and the West. At the same time, Ankara would experience rapid economic growth and development.


This stage would change from 2008 and 2009, Turkey ceased to see the US and the EU as crucial partners. This estrangement with the US and the EU would accelerate after the Arab Revolts in 2011. Ankara would see Moscow as a major player in this region and decide to cooperate with Russia. At the same time, Ankara would seek to rise as an independent actor and regional power seeking to regain its influence.


Moreover, in 2019, Ankara declared high priority to relations with Central Asian countries as part of its New Asian Initiative, which has been accompanied by unprecedented diplomatic activity and huge investments.

Fuente 1: Turkey’s exports to Central Asia, million $. Retrieved from: https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/trade-between-turkey-and-central-asia/


Turkey's current strategy is in line with its approach to international relations. Its plan focuses on two axes to make the Central Asian states play to its interests. On the one hand, Ankara concentrated on so-called "soft power" in the religious, cultural, media and educational fields.


On the one hand Ankara focused on soft power. Turkish newspapers such as Zaman, in the hands of the controversial cleric Fetullah Güllen, would be distributed in these states in the respective languages of the region, both in the Cyrillic alphabet and in the Latin alphabet with Turkish language characters. This strategy would be successful, since, in this region, there was no centralized or structured body clarifying linguistic norms and structures. It should be mentioned that, at the beginning of the 21st century, countries such as Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan would abandon or are about to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet in favor of the Latin alphabet with Turkish characters.


In 2014, sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States on Russia, weakened it somewhat. In these years, the emergence of DAESH prompted certain citizens of these states to join its ranks and the Russian narrative would change in one part. It should be mentioned that, there were many arrests of Central Asian workers inside Russia accused of conspiring in acts of terrorism, for example the ongoing court case related to the St. Petersburg subway bombing in 2017.


Ankara offered them free visas and work permits and removed them from Russia. This move made the Central Asian workers among the top five workers in Turkey. In turn, Turkey wanted to gain economic dominance over Central Asia, even at the expense of itself. Foreign workers were coming to work in Turkey when the country had 3.8 million unemployed and 20% youth unemployment. Ankara accepted 3,000 immigrants from Uzbekistan, a third of them illegally.


After the fall of the USSR, the public expression and practice of Islam was no longer forbidden in the former Soviet republics. As a result, the new governments in Central Asia were able to keep control of any religious aspects that could become a threat and use religion to develop a national identity. Turkey was seen as a preferred partner, and it was clear to Ankara that this region should not fall under the religious influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia.


This translated with the founding in 1994, with the founding of the Eurasian Islamic Council ("Avrasya Islam Şurası"). This branch depends on the Diyalnet organization. For example, this body built the largest mosques in the region. In turn, the Turkish Diyanet has educated the new Islamic elites by establishing theology departments modeled after the prestigious theology faculty of Marmara University. Turkish imams are sent to these countries, albeit in small numbers and often only in the month of Ramadan, to preach in the mosques of Central Asia and the Caucasus in cooperation with local religious leaders.


Another example of this soft power has been the establishment of the Central Asian Universities Association. This association brings together the most prestigious universities in the region, together with Turkish higher education institutions, and the creation of a wide network of schools funded by the Turkish government. This has allowed students from the Central Asian republics to have preferential conditions to study there.


On the other hand, Ankara focuses on the military aspect. Turkey plays a special role in Central Asia, being the main partner of the countries of this region within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace. It should be mentioned that, in 1993, Turkey and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on military education, and in addition to military officers, officers of the security forces also received training in Turkey. In the same year similar agreements were signed with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and in 1994 also with Kazakhstan. In 2013 Kazakhstan and Turkey started joint military production.


Source 2: Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan and former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev applauding an agreement on military cooperation in 2020. Retrieved from:https://nordicmonitor.com/2020/05/turkey-kazakhstan-agree-on-military-cooperation-that-covers-military-intelligence-defence-industry-and-joint-projects/


In May 2020, Turkey and Kazakhstan agree to cooperate in the defense industry; exchange of military intelligence; participation in joint exercises and training; logistical cooperation, grants and logistical support; communications, electronics, information systems and cyber defense; peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations; and exchange of information and experience in nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical protection.


The prestige of Turkish weapons and interest in them grew significantly after the Azerbaijan-Armenia war in the late 2020s. Between November 23-25, 2020, a military delegation from Kazakhstan visited Turkey. During the visit, the Kazakh military inspected Turkish drones at a base in the city of Batman, where the Bayraktar are based.


In November 2021, Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security Chairman Kamchybek Tashiev said Bishkek would complete the procurement, but gave no further details. Some reports suggest that Bishkek has already ordered three TB2s. Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian country to do so.


The rest of the players in Central Asia are also making investments in various fields, such as: trade, raw materials, among others. Ankara has an advantage over other competitors such as China. This advantage is centered on an identical cultural legacy and Ankara maintains a neutral stance on the political character of these states, except for the Andijian massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005. Likewise, Turkey's role towards greater economic transition in Central Asia has been welcomed by the political elite in the region.


At the same time, Turkey has achieved that, Moscow perceives Turkey's increased engagement as "a lesser evil" compared to Beijing's growing influence in the region.


On the economic side, trade between the two sides, shown in Source 1 increased over time. Kazakhstan has been the most important country for Turkey. In October 2009, former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a strategic partnership treaty in Turkey. Ankara has actively supported Kazakhstan's candidacy to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as its desire to assume the rotating leadership of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).


Currently, Turkey's TAV Airports is the beneficial owner of shares in the airport in Kazakhstan's largest city and related companies providing fuel and catering services.


In Kyrgyzstan, following ethnic clashes in 2010, Turkey provided humanitarian aid during the unrest and subsequently pledged $20 million for technical assistance and joint projects. However, according to one Turkish observer, some protests in the country have directly targeted Turkish companies as too close to the government. Ankara has therefore played a cautious and more neutral role in this state.


In Turkmenistan, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that in "2012, Turkish-Turkmen relations, having gained new momentum, have continued to develop rapidly with a busy schedule of high-level visits".


Recently, in 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Turkmen counterpart Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov declared that the two states want to increase their trade volume to $5 billion. To this end, agreements were signed in central banking, public broadcasting and official news agencies, health and medicine, education and horse breeding. Turkish companies play an important role in the relationship, with more than 600 registered in the country.


Alongside this, one of the geostrategic priorities for Turkey has been to achieve energy independence. Currently, Ankara is subject to vulnerability due to high energy dependence and lack of natural resources on its territory. For a long time, the two main exporters of natural gas to Turkey were Russia and Iran, two countries with which Turkey has competitive regional aspirations.


In recent years, Turkey has pursued a policy of energy independence. During the first half of 2020, natural gas imports from Iran and Russia decreased by 44.8% and 41.5%, respectively, compared to the same period in 2019. Azerbaijan has been a key player thanks to the TANAP pipeline.


However, Turkmenistan may play a key piece in this energy puzzle. As early as December 2007, Turkey offered to revive the idea of building a pipeline to supply gas from Turkmenistan via Iran, as stated by former Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler. This idea would be abandoned due to pressure from Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran.


Recently, a new Florida-based company hopes to have devised a solution to the age-old puzzle of how to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan's huge reserves across the Caspian to Azerbaijan and, potentially, to Europe.


On the diplomatic front, the most important piece has been the creation of the Turkic Council in 2009, five years after Ankara hosted the NATO summit in Istanbul. This summit was the largest expansion of the military bloc in history.


The Turkic Council counted in its four members - Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On September 12, 2019, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu announced that Uzbekistan had applied to become the fifth member of the organization, while Turkmenistan is considering applying as an observer.


Prior to 2020, the summits focused on cooperation in: trade, transport and customs, education and tourism. In August 2019, the member states established the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Istanbul. Beyond the Turkic Council, Ankara coordinates its bilateral ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and, more recently, Uzbekistan through the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Councils, which regularly bring together heads of state, ministers and high-level bureaucrats.


Source 3: "President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev receives the Supreme Order of the Turkic World from the Organization of Turkic States, November 12, 2021, from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan". Retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/erdogan-envisions-alliance-turkic-speaking-states


An special meeting was held on September 27, 2021 , in Istanbul to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, following the return to power of the Taliban regime in August 2021. At this meeting the parties agreed to maintain consultation and coordination and coordination regarding the various aspects and repercussions of developments in Afghanistan.


The most recent attempt has been with the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, popularly known as COVID-19. The mismanagement of this pandemic has caused significant economic and political disruption worldwide and in the region. However, like other actors, Turkey is focusing on "health diplomacy". It is worth mentioning that, in early August 2020, Ankara announced the shipment of medical aid to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The items gifted include ambulances, ventilators, test kits and other supplies to help control the spread of COVID-19 in the region. At the same time, Turkey released its aid packages to Kazakhstan.


Over time, Turkey has become an increasingly important player in the Central Asian region, thanks to the use of soft and military power in a pragmatic manner. On the military side, hundreds of military personnel from the Central Asian republics have received training in Turkey through bilateral defense programs.


However, Turkey-Central Asia relations are far from their original promise. The relationship "is not really practical," says Bakyt Beshimov, a former Kyrgyz politician and analyst of Turkey-Central Asia relations.


Furthermore, Bershimov states that the state of current relations with the former Soviet Turkic republics pales in comparison to Russia's military reach or, especially, China's financial presence. And this reality will not change soon. However, the future is not set in stone and time will tell whether Ankara continues to gain influence in the region or not.


Suggested readings:

  1. IISS. 2021. Turkey’s Central Asia policy. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2021/turkey-central-asia-policy

  2. Wheeler, T., 2013. Turkey’s role and interests in Central Asia. Saferworld. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172943/turkeys-role-and-interests-in-central-asia.pdf

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